New Political Economy
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cnpe20

The Bank for International Settlements
Leonard Seabrooke

a International Center for Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School, Steen Blichers Vej 22, 2000, Frederiksberg, Denmark

To cite this article: Leonard Seabrooke (2006): The Bank for International Settlements, New Political Economy, 11:1, 141-149
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563460500494982

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is the proverbial ‘IT staff’ of the global economy. While other international economic institutions are highly visible, the BIS remains mostly out of the public eye while it weaves a set of rules, norms and decision-making procedures that establish governance structures for both public and private international banks. Without the BIS, information sharing among central banks and private financial institutions would be seriously troubled. These institutions would face severe information asymmetries, their assessments of creditworthiness would be harder to establish, and the effective management of currency crises would be more difficult to achieve. In an environment where average daily turnover in foreign exchange markets is now US$1.9 trillion, and the market for investment risk protection alone is worth US$4.5 trillion per year, the BIS’s ‘firewalls’ are important to prevent the global financial system from being, as it were, ‘spammed’. Yet, like our lack of understanding of how the IT staff is (most of the time) able to prevent the e-mail system from crashing or our files being wiped, most of us don’t know exactly what the BIS does to provide us with the networks that allow global finance to run smoothly (at least most of the time).

Known as the ‘Bank of Central Banks’, the BIS’s original charge in 1930 was to ‘promote the co-operation of central banks and to provide additional facilities for international financial operations; and to act as a trustee or agent in regard to international financial settlements entrusted to it under agreements with the parties concerned’. Today, the BIS still provides an institutional space for the sharing of information among central bank governors, but it is equally concerned with the development of international banking regulation and the collation and dissemination of financial data to international financial institutions and private financial market actors. This Global Monitor report provides an overview of the purposes and functions of the BIS and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, as well as contemporary problems and debates in international cooperation for financial regulation. The report provides a description of the BIS’s institutional
characteristics, a lightning summary of how the institution was transformed between the 1930s and 1980s, a discussion of the formation of ‘Basle Accords’, and an examination of the BIS’s recent efforts to build networks for monitoring and surveillance at the individual, regional and international levels. Finally, the report reflects on how we may think of this unique institution within the broader context of academic debate concerning how international economic institutions can reconfigure actors’ ideas and interests.

Nuts and bolts of an international ‘quango’

The BIS was established as an international economic institution that is separate from the fiscal obligations of any country, but is also a limited-liability company under Swiss law.\(^3\) The BIS may therefore be understood as something of an intergovernmental ‘quango’ (quasi-non-governmental organisation), in that it acts as a service provider of public goods that is underwritten by its shareholding central bank members.\(^4\) As such, the BIS has the capacity to act on behalf of any central bank and as a trustee to facilitate international settlements, but claims against it are limited. A further purpose of the BIS’s limited liability status is to affirm that its function is not economically redistributive, like the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but to provide technical knowledge and banking services.

The institution is based in Basle, Switzerland, and is governed by a Board of Directors that is chaired by a central bank governor of one of the BIS member states. The original Board of Directors was established by the governors of its founding central banks (Belgium, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, with banking conglomerates from Japan and United States of America), with each governor appointing a second representative of the same nationality from private industry to affirm the bank’s standing in the capitalist system. The Board can also elect up to nine other governors from shareholding banks, although until recently only representatives from the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland were included.\(^5\) In addition to in-house governance, the BIS holds annual general meetings that bring together representatives from central banks and international economic institutions. In 2005 more than one hundred central banks attended. However, only shareholding member central banks, currently numbering 55, have a right to vote on decisions.

The BIS uses the IMF currency, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), for all transactions.\(^6\) As of March 2005, the BIS held total assets of SDR 180,486 million (US$275,060 million, of which time deposits and advances to banks made up 44 per cent, while Treasury bills were 17.3 per cent), and total liabilities of SDR 170,233 million (US$259,435 million, of which 88 per cent are currency deposits). Because the BIS functions as a working bank for central banks, it funds itself through its trading activities. Between 1993 and 2005, it distributed 13–31 per cent of its net profits through dividends to its shareholders, who are central banks that may re-sell their shares to the general public while retaining formal ownership.\(^7\)

The BIS currently employs 560 staff from 49 different countries, the vast majority of which are located within the internal bureaucracy and the BIS’s
main official arms, the Monetary and Economic Department and the Banking Department. In addition, the BIS now incorporates a Legal Service and Compliance, Internal Audit and Risk Control units, reflecting both concerns with offering better representation to a larger group of member central banks, and the growing trend among international economic institutions to demonstrate their own transparency. In addition to these units, the BIS has its own Financial Stability Institute (FSI) and BIS Representative Offices for regional trading operations in Hong Kong and Mexico City. The BIS also acts as a ‘host’ for the Financial Stability Forum, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors and the International Association of Deposit Insurers.

Formally, the Board of Directors sit on Executive, Audit and Consultative committees to determine BIS policy directions. However, the BIS is better known for its ‘voluntary policy arms’, its committee systems that have no international legal enforcement capacities but which shape the character of the global financial order. These committees are, respectively, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Committee on Payment and Settlements Systems (CPSS), the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS, called the Euro-currency Standing Committee prior to 1999) and the Markets Committee. The CGFS and the Market Committee provide an important monitoring function. Among the committees, by far the most prominent is the BCBS, which produced the ‘Basle Accord’ of 1988 and 2004. Since 1974 the committee has met four times a year and comprises representatives from the central bank and key prudential bank regulators from the Group of Ten (G10). More generally, the G10 is involved in discussions concerning economic trends and global financial architecture.

**Evolution: from banking reparations to repairing commercial banks**

The BIS’s original purpose was to assist in overcoming the collective action problem concerning German reparations payments. During the 1930s, the BIS provided emergency financing to German and Austrian central banks, but soon shifted the focus to coordinating credit networks among central bank governors of its member states. During the 1950s and 1960s, the BIS created currency swap networks to support the Bretton Woods monetary regime, as well as providing emergency currency support to France, Italy and the UK.

After the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary regime, the BIS responded to new developments in the global financial order by providing new regulatory standards for internationally active commercial banks. Following commercial bank collapses from currency speculation in 1974, the BIS developed the G10 BCBS, originally established as the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices. This committee sought to create new standards and safeguards for central banks, national prudential regulators and commercial banks in order to provide a ‘normalisation’ of financial markets. Of particular concern to the BCBS was the growth of syndicated international bank lending, where a number of banks held a part of the loan to diversify their risks in an otherwise lucrative business. Such activities led to ‘overlending’ to fragile economies (80 per cent of recipients were the governments of developing states), while at the same time banks were depleting the resources in case of default. The largest
US banks, for example, halved their ‘capital adequacy ratios’ in the late 1970s. The BIS warned that crisis was imminent, a prediction that was soon borne out by events. The experience of the Debt Crisis demonstrated the need for a more intensive regime on international banking that would require banks to put some capital aside for a rainy day.¹³

The Basle Accords

The basic idea of the Basle Accords is neatly surmised by Kenneth Rogoff: ‘so bank managers will not be able to make one-way bets: that is, risky loans pay off, the bank wins big, and if they do not the taxpayer foots the bill for paying off the depositors’.¹⁴ In response to the Debt Crisis there was a loose consensus that there should be new regulations to ensure that international banks had capital adequacy and that they did not fall into ‘moral hazard’ traps. The Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve held discussions on how to tackle this problem that established the groundwork for a new BIS accord and satisfied their mutual interest in hobbling Japanese bank competitiveness. The European Community also provided their internal regulations on banking soundness that arguably forced the US’s hand. Either way, the BCBS provided extensive negotiations between G10 central bank governors and formulated the ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards’ of 1988.¹⁵ This ‘Basle Accord’ (‘Basle I’) required international banks to hold 8 per cent of their capital aside as a safeguard in case of financial crises. Half of this ‘regulatory capital’ was to be core capital (equity plus disclosed reserves) and the other half ‘supplementary capital’ that passed through a bank’s profit and loss account. The safest type of capital to hold was determined by the BIS to be Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) government debt. To meet Basle Accord standards by the 1992 deadline, commercial banks purchased some US$150 billion in government securities, of which US Treasury debt was the most liquid.¹⁶ As a consequence, Basle Accord I was a fiscal windfall for the US.

By 1992, 130 countries had adopted, in principle, the Basle Accord standard despite the lack of a formal enforcement mechanism from the BIS and BCBS.¹⁷ Within OECD countries implementation was rigorous, with international markets providing extra reinforcement by placing premiums on the trading operations of non-compliant banks (as happened to many Japanese banks in the mid-1990s).¹⁸ Adoption of the accord, however, reflected both the simplicity of the regulations and how far removed financial practices were from its constraints. Even in 1986 the BIS recognised that, following the Debt Crisis, syndicated bank lending had died and banks were rapidly going through a process of ‘disintermediation’ and off-balance securitisation.¹⁹ The increasing practice of removing assets from a bank’s balance sheet through the use of innovative debt securities made the Basle I’s assessment of risks held by banks out of touch with market practices. In 1996 the BCBS made amendments to Basle I to incorporate market risks, with banks using their own internal risk assessment models.²⁰ US regulators favoured this method of risk assessment, where institutions could
precommit’ their capital adequacy ratios according to internal assessments. The UK and the European Union, however, called for stronger formal standards. In 1999 BCBS proposed that a new accord was required to increase ‘competitive equality’ among internationally active banks, particularly as US banks – which were most heavily engaged in disintermediation – were able to have more capital at work than was reflected in their official capital adequacy ratios. In addition to the credit risks (prospect of default) on traditional banking loans, the new accord would tackle market risks (from changes in interest and exchange rates and equity and commodity prices) and, importantly, operational risks (‘the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems, or from external events’). The key obstacle for the new accord was to reconcile a standardised method among all banks with sufficient leeway in internal risk assessment. Given the continuation of national and regional divergence in banking systems, the BCBS’s task was particularly arduous.

In June 2004 the BCBS released the ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework’, commonly referred to as ‘Basle II’. The new accord is built upon three pillars. Pillar I states that banks must hold at least 8 per cent of ‘regulatory capital’ (their capital adequacy) in relation to their risk weighted assets. Pillar II sets supervisory standards within banks. Pillar III emphasises public disclosure of a bank’s financial position to allow market forces to discipline institutions.

Most of the recent attention and debate has focused on the standardised approach within Pillar I’s risk weightings. Here, risk is assessed by BIS internal assessment and by credit rating agencies (CRAs), with ‘AAA’ ratings receiving 20 per cent, with scales of 50 to 100 per cent on A grade variations until ‘B’ ratings receive a weighting of 150 per cent of committed capital. So, to take an example, if a bank lent $1 million to a corporation with a rating of ‘AAA’, it would have to put aside $16,000 (8 per cent of 20 per cent of $1 million), while if it lent the same amount to a company in a developing country with a ‘B’ rating, it would need to put aside $120,000 (8 per cent of 150 per cent of $1 million). Understandably, the accord is criticised for being biased against developing countries, as well as for its reliance on ‘impartial’ CRAs.

Basle II also provides an ‘internal rating-based’ (IRB) approach as an alternative to the Pillar I standardised approach. Here, the bank is required to assess each borrower’s creditworthiness (the ‘KYC’ – ‘know your customer’ – approach) to predict future losses and then use regulatory benchmarks or historical records of loss on loans as a risk weighting. Basle II compliance therefore requires banks that are not already up to speed to invest heavily in staff and technology to improve their customer creditworthiness assessment. As a consequence, US regulators and banks complain that the new accord imposes unnecessary costs on some of the most competitive financial instruments and financial institutions, such as asset-backed securities held by small- to medium-sized banks (95 per cent of US banks are in this category). The biggest losers from the accord, however, are developing countries who have little capacity to provide the monitoring infrastructure to reduce risk weightings for themselves and their clients.
Networks for micro- and macro-prudential regulation

From the mid-1990s onwards, the BIS has asserted the need for micro- and macro-prudential regulation within the global financial order. Micro-prudential regulation includes knowledge and information-sharing among banking and securities regulators, as well as the creation of clear management standards. Macro-prudential regulation includes similar activities among international economic institutions, both public and private.

The BIS has a good track record of encouraging the development of networks among international economic institutions. In 1992 it assisted in the creation of the ‘Joint Vienna Institute’ alongside the IMF, the European Community, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank and the OECD. This institute sought to provide technical assistance to Central and Eastern European countries and the newly independent former Soviet republics following the collapse of the Soviet system. It also provided an opportunity for the BIS to establish data-sharing relationships with the major international economic institutions. Following the Asian and Russian financial crises of 1997–8 (which it successfully predicted), the BIS hosted a Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to bring together central bank officials, national financial regulators and representatives from the IMF, among others. Importantly, the FSF dramatically expanded the number of countries involved in discussions, with potentially greater voice for the Group of Twenty (G20), and also increased the range of topics on the table, including, for example, the regulation of hedge funds and offshore financial centres. In 1999 the BIS also set up the Financial Stability Institute to promote common standards in financial regulation and to act as a ‘one stop shop’ for regulators to learn about new market instruments and techniques. In addition, since 1999, the BIS, IMF, World Bank and OECD have published creditor-based measures of developing and transition countries’ external debt. All of these activities are designed to thicken the information networks among international economic institutions with the desire of creating a global standard of market civilisation.

One interesting aspect of the BIS is its efforts to support regionalisation. While many other international economic institutions are criticised for policy homogeneity that cannot account for regional differences (criticisms that are waged particularly against the IMF), the BIS has actively sought to create regional offices and build relationships with central banks and regional associations that are inclusive rather than exclusive. This also occurs at a time when new shareholding member central banks are from Central Europe, East Asia and the Western Hemisphere. During the past 15 years, the BIS has maintained a consistent presence at regional associations in an advisory role. From these earlier connections, the BIS opened up an Asian regional representative office in Hong Kong and an American representative office in Mexico City. Furthermore, in July 2003, the BIS took over the management of the US$1 billion Asian Bond Fund (ABF) created by the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia–Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP). In addition to encouraging macro-prudential regulations through regional and international forums and involving CRAs in monitoring, the BIS places great emphasis on the capacity to influence central bankers’ ideas and interests.
through the forging of close personal networks. As such, the BIS actively cultivates what Timothy J. Sinclair has recently termed ‘embedded knowledge networks’. The BIS has explicitly sought to foster a ‘culture of risk management’ among central bankers that can reduce procyclical ‘overlending’. The BIS also stresses the importance of training central bank officials, and others, to read and interpret financial data. From the BIS’s viewpoint, frequent meetings and the establishment of common frames for understanding are more likely to produce ‘symmetrical regulatory policy’ that fosters not only better financial and monetary regulation but also stronger commitments to publicly defending inflation and deficit targets. The question here, of course, is whether those attending these meetings are responsible to the BIS as shareholders in the institution, or to their own governments and people.

**Last words**

The BIS has a special place within the global political economy as the key financial regulator but also as an institution that is a limited liability company with no formal capacity to enforce the standards it generates. Instead, the BIS relies on its capacity to gather and share information, to convince central banks of their best interests at a collective and individual level and, after all, to represent its shareholders. Given these attributes, it is perhaps surprising that the bulk of work on this international quango has stressed how it is conveniently used by Great Powers in their self-interested desire to overcome collective action problems. As the institution has no formal enforcement powers to ‘lock in’ member central banks, one of its key tasks is to shape and transform central bankers’ and prudential regulators’ ideas and therefore interests. So far the BIS appears to have succeeded in doing so. While strategic action and financial innovations provide central and commercial banks some room to move, it is difficult to defy a web of rules, norms and decision-making procedures that has become so deeply ingrained. Basle II provides a good example here of how an IT staff’s maintenance of networks and structures places great pressure on the executive staff to follow suit rather than buck the system. In early 2003 US regulators were wavering in their willingness to agree to Basle II and even following the agreement, in September 2005, the Federal Reserve announced that US financial regulators would delay implementation of the accords until 2008. Nonetheless, the USA intends to implement the accord.

Finally, while shared ideas and interests among friends may be all well and good, there is a growing legitimacy gap between the prudential financial regulation being devised by the BIS and BCBS, and what can actually be implemented. Basle II is likely to place a hefty premium on most developing countries’ financial activities and will not necessarily increase financial stability. This problem is particularly troublesome given the amount of capital required for providing the technical infrastructure to meet Basle II standards. As a consequence, developing countries face both internal and external constraints on the amount of capital they can access. The drive among international economic institutions, both public and private, to improve their arm’s-length capacity to assess the credit-worthiness of developing countries is one key feature of this current period of
financial globalisation. While this aim is undoubtedly superior to the ‘gunboat diplomacy’ of the last period of financial globalisation, it does not obscure critically important questions concerning the legitimacy of our global financial order.

Notes

My thanks to André Broome, John M. Hobson, Shogo Suzuki and Guðríðr Weihe for their comments and suggestions.

1. Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 75th Annual Report (BIS, 2005), pp. 80, 116. Foreign exchange turnover has increased 36 per cent since 2001. The investor protection figure is for ‘credit default swaps’, which is an agreement between two parties to mitigate credit risks on investments. This market has increased sixfold since 2001. It works like this: David lent Linda some money and he worries about her capacity to repay. Anna, the cunning devil, then offers to cover any losses David may incur if he agrees to give her 2 per cent of the value of the loan every three months for five years.

2. Article 3 of BIS Statutes (1930).


4. While this term normally refers to local government operations, it also works internationally.

5. Currently the Board has 17 members, of which six sit permanently (the same founders, minus Japan) and the remaining members comprise their ‘seconders’ and three countries (Canada, Japan and the Netherlands) currently elected to Board. Nout Wellink, the President of the Netherlands, is currently the Chairman and Malcolm D. Knight is currently the General Manager.

6. The BIS changed to the SDR in April 2003.

7. Calculated from BIS annual reports for 1993 to 2005. The upper end of this figure, some 30.7 per cent, was that proposed for 2005, a nearly 12 per cent increase on 2004. The low point, 13.7 per cent, was registered in 1999 following the Asian and Russian financial crises. In terms of profits returned as a proportion of total assets, the BIS is not as competitive as US banks but out-performed both German and Japanese banks in 2004. BIS, 75th Annual Report, pp. 121, 188, 192.


9. The BIS directly collects economic data from 34 of its member central banks and reports on the domestic issuance of securities in 47 countries. Its international financial statistics cover 95 per cent of all banking transactions, a service the BIS has provided since 1983. See Toniolo, Central Bank Cooperation, p. 685.

10. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.


19. BIS, Recent Innovations in International Banking (BIS, 1986). One simple way to consider this process is that rather than maintaining long-term traditional loans, banks increasingly turned to exchanging ‘IOUs’ that could be bought and sold either short term or long term. For more, see Leonard Seabrooke, ‘Disintermediation’, in Martin Griffiths (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of International Relations and Global Politics (Routledge, 2005), pp. 193–6.


23. ‘Basel II: Blip on the radar screen or major event?’, *Bank News*, 1 April 2003.


30. Randall D. Germain ‘Global Financial Governance and the Problem of Inclusion’, *Global Governance*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2001), pp. 411–26. The G20 includes the finance ministers and central bank governors of: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK and the USA. It also includes representatives from the EU, the IMF and the World Bank.


32. The most recent publication of these statistics, in August 2005, included data on 176 countries.


34. For example, in 2004 BIS representatives attended five regional central bank associations in Africa.


39. Other institutions, however, do enforce BIS standards. For example, the IMF included Basle I compliance in loan conditions that followed the Asian and Russian financial crises.


44. Recent estimates suggest Asian banks will spend up to 11 per cent of their annual budgets on building information technology systems for Basel II compliance until 2012, an investment considered to be ‘a large investment with little bottom line returns’. See ‘Compliance architecture for financial institutions’, *New Straits Times*, 12 September 2005.
